State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has accepted review on Kalal, the seminal statutory interpretation case in Wisconsin. What does it mean?

The case holds that statutory interpretation should primarily focus on the language enacted by the Legislature. Courts have a duty to apply the law as written. While outside sources such as legislative history can sometimes be relevant, they are not the starting point because the enacted law—not unenacted legislative intent—is what legally binds the public. “Statutory interpretation “begins with the language of the statute.”  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 663, 681 N.W.2d 110, 124. A court should rely on “primarily on intrinsic sources of statutory meaning and confines resort to extrinsic sources of legislative intent to cases in which the statutory language is ambiguous.”  Id. at ¶ 43. If the meaning of the statute is plain, a court can stop the inquiry. Id. at ¶ 45. “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.”  Id.

The court states that interpretation begins with the statute’s actual words. If the language has a plain meaning, courts ordinarily stop their inquiry and apply it. Words are generally given their common and accepted meanings, while technical or specially defined terms receive their specialized meanings. However, courts must read statutory language in context, considering the statute as a whole, related statutes, and its structure, while giving effect to every word and avoiding unreasonable or absurd results. “Context is important to meaning.”  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2dat ¶ 46. “Statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.”  Id.

A statute is considered ambiguous only when reasonably well-informed people could understand its language in two or more ways. Mere disagreement about what a statute means does not automatically make it ambiguous. The court also clarifies that a statute’s scope, context, and purpose can be considered even when the statute is unambiguous, as long as those considerations come from the statutory text and structure themselves. Courts generally should not rely on external sources, such as legislative history, unless they need to resolve genuine ambiguity. “The test for ambiguity generally keeps the focus on the statutory language: a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses. Bruno , 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶19; Martin , 162 Wis. 2d at 894. It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the statute “to determine whether ‘well-informed persons should have become confused,’ that is, whether the statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to different meanings.” Bruno , 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶21 (second emphasis added). “Statutory interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search for ambiguity.” Id. , ¶25.” Kalal at ¶47.

What’s the issue now?

The issues presented to the court are as follows:

Should this Court revisit and modify the framework for statutory interpretation set out in State ex. rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, under which the determination of whether a statutory term has a plain meaning or is ambiguous is limited to dictionary definitions and “intrinsic” sources, in favor of a broader, holistic approach that gives due consideration “to relevant extrinsic sources to interpret a statute’s meaning, conscious … of those sources’ limitations?” See SEIU Healthcare Wisconsin v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, ¶65, 416 Wis. 2d 688, 22 N.W.3d 876 (Dallet, J., concurring).

Alternatively, did the Court of Appeals err in treating the statutory “public policy declaration” in Wis. Stat. § 108.01 as merely a rule of construction, rather than a textual statement of scope and purpose that under Kalal must be considered to determine the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(k)16. in the first instance, with the result that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the statutory term “consumer products” was unambiguous?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the statutory interpretation framework established by this Court in State ex. rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 by not giving due consideration to an applicable intrinsic source, the Unemployment Act’s purpose statement under Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1), and the plain meaning of the law?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(k)16. by finding the statutory phrase “consumer products” unambiguous, and by doing so, did it err by resorting to multiple dictionary definitions to separately define each word and by disregarding relevant extrinsic sources?

The Court of Appeals did not address whether Kalal should be revisited. The Petitioner believes that Kalal should be reexamined. Petitioner argues that Kalal recognizes that statutory language should be given its full, proper, and intended effect, id., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, but goes on to mandate a restrictive approach to ascertaining that effect, one which purports to elevate statutory text. In practice, however, the “textual” sources often provide little guidance or are simply overlooked, leading courts to resort to a sterile analysis confined to dictionary definitions obtained from sources outside the actual statutory text.

Follow here for more as this case is heard during the current term.